Timothy Williamson

Professorial Fellow; Wykeham Professor of Logic
MA Dub, MA DPhil Oxf, FRSE, FBA

Tim Williamsontimothy.williamson@new.ox.ac.uk

Tim Williamson studied mathematics and philosophy at Oxford. Before coming to New College, he was a lecturer in philosophy at Trinity College Dublin (1980-88), a fellow and tutor in philosophy at University College Oxford (1988-94), and Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh University(1995-2000). He has held visiting positions at MIT, Princeton, the Australian National University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and elsewhere, and is a Fellow of the British Academy and a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Teaching

His teaching is in the Philosophy Faculty, mainly of students working for the BPhil and DPhil, in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. His current teaching duties are limited while he holds a Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship (2009-12).

Research Interests

Tim Williamson’s research ranges from broad questions about the nature of knowledge to technical work in branches of formal logic such as modal logic and epistemic logic. He has published articles and books on topics including the logic and semantics of vague languages; identity and indiscriminabilty; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; limits on what can be known; the speech act of assertion; unrestricted generality; philosophical method. He is currently writing a book about the metaphysics of first-order and higher-order modal logic, on whether there could have been more or fewer things than there actually are.

Selected publications

  • Knowledge and its Limits, 2000, Oxford University Press.
  • The Philosophy of Philosophy, 2007, Blackwell.
  • Replies to critics. in P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, eds., Williamson on Knowledge, 2009, Oxford University Press.
  • Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives, in J. Almog and P. Leonardi, eds., The Philosophy of David Kaplan, 2009, Oxford University Press.
  • Necessitism, contingentism and plural quantification, Mind 119, 2010.